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Abstract
In this paper we take a closer look at a recently proposed classiﬁcation scheme for multiagent learning algorithms. Based on this scheme an exploitation mechanism
(we call it the Exploiter) was developed that could beat various Policy Hill Climbers (PHC) and other fair opponents
in some repeated matrix games. We show on the contrary
that some fair opponents may actually beat the Exploiter in
repeated games. This clearly indicates a deﬁciency in the
original classiﬁcation scheme which we address. Speciﬁcally, we introduce a new measure called Reactivity that
measures how fast a learner can adapt to an unexpected hypothetical change in the opponent’s policy. We show that in
some games, this new measure can approximately predict
the performance of a player, and based on this measure we
explain the behaviors of various algorithms in the Matching Pennies game, which was inexplicable by the original
scheme. Finally we show that under certain restrictions, a
player that consciously tries to avoid exploitation may be
unable to do so.

1. Introduction
Multiagent Learning (MAL) is an intersection of Distributed Artiﬁcial Intelligence (DAI) and Machine Learning
(ML). Broad and well-developed as Machine Learning is,
it is still incomplete without adequately addressing learning in Multiagent Systems (MAS). Agents in a MAS typically operate in large, complex, open, dynamic and unpredictable environments. Therefore it is necessary to endow such agents with capabilities to adapt to such environments. MAL is also an area where ML and Game Theory
[16] meet. The latter has been extensively used for modeling concurrent reinforcement learning problems. Several
algorithms for multiagent reinforcement learning have been
proposed [6, 9, 11, 10], mostly guaranteed to converge to
an equilibrium in the limit. It has been argued [2] that one
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of the key requirements for a MAL algorithm is convergence to a stationary policy, usually conditioned on the
other agents’ play.
Recently Chang and Kaelbling [5] have argued that most
of the existing MAL algorithms assume that the opponents are playing stationary policies. While some others like
Bully and Godfather [12] do assume that the opponents are
also learning, they make a limited usage of history. Multiplicative weight adaptation [7] assumes the opponent can
play non-stationary strategies but is limited by the assumption of complete knowledge of the opponents’ strategies.
Chang and Kaelbling then suggested a classiﬁcation scheme
that identiﬁes a learner’s usage of history (H) and its belief
(B) about the opponent using their histories to play possibly non-stationary policies. An agent in class H s × Bt uses
its memory of s previous time periods to decide its current
strategy and believes that the opponent does the same for t
previous time periods. Having an opponent model has been
shown to present advantage to a learner before [4]. Chang
and Kaelbling have shown that the ability to model an opponent’s learning algorithm may produce a learner in the
league H∞ × B∞ that often achieves more than the equilibrium payoff against several existing learning algorithms.
This learner, called PHC-Exploiter (we shall call it Exploiter henceforth), was found to score at least the expected
equilibrium payoff against many PHC variants, Q-learners
(Q0 and Q1 ), Minimax and Nash-Qs[10, 9] and other “fair
opponents”, i.e. learners in H × B class equal or less capable than the Exploiter. In this paper we show that though
the Exploiter has been explicitly designed to beat PHC and
other fair opponents, some of these opponents can actually
beat the Exploiter. Based on this observation we argue that
the H × B based classiﬁcation scheme is deﬁcient. We then
present a novel criterion called reactivity for rating various
learning algorithms and quantify an effective reactivity for
policy iterators. We show that this criterion can effectively
explain the behaviors of the PHC variants against the Exploiter in the Matching Pennies game. We also show that
under some restrictions and a speciﬁc sense of the term ex-

ploitation, a player that consciously tries to avoid exploitation may be unable to do so.

2. Background & Deﬁnitions
Here we provide deﬁnitions of key concepts for our
work. We refer to A i as the set of possible actions available
to the ith agent. A mixed policy, π i for agent i, is a probability distribution over A i . If the entire probability mass is
concentrated on a single action, it is also called a pure policy.
Deﬁnition 1 A bimatrix game is given by a pair of matrices, (M1 , M2 ), (each of size |A1 | × |A2 | for a two-agent
game) where the payoff of the kth agent for the joint action (a1 , a2 ) is given by the entry M k (a1 , a2 ), ∀(a1 , a2 ) ∈
A1 × A2 , k = 1, 2.
A constant-sum game (also called competitive games) is a
special bimatrix game where
M1 (a1 , a2 ) + M2 (a1 , a2 ) = c, ∀(a1 , a2 ) ∈ A1 × A2
where c is a constant. If c = 0, then it is also called a zerosum game.
We consider the problem of concurrent learning in the
context of repeated play of a bimatrix game by two agents.
The policy of the opponent of agent i is written as π −i . The
expected payoff of agent i is
Vi (πi , π−i ) =



π1 (a1 )π2 (a2 )Mi (a1 , a2 ), i = 1, 2

(a1 ,a2 )∈A1 ×A2

In a repeated game, the goal of the learner (agent i) is to deduce a policy that maximises V i (πi , π−i ) against the opponent’s policy.
Deﬁnition 2 A best response of agent i to its opponent’s
policy, π−i , is a set of probability vectors BR i (π−i ) deﬁned as BRi (π−i ) = {πi∗ ∈ P D(Ai )|Vi (πi∗ , π−i ) ≥
Vi (πi , π−i ), ∀πi ∈ P D(Ai )}, where P D(Ai ) is the set of
probability distributions over A i .
It is the set of optimal policies that an agent can play to
maximize its expected payoff given the opponent is playing π−i . If both of the players are playing mutual best responses, then they are said to be in a Nash equilibrium. It is
a joint policy point from where no player has any incentive
for unilateral deviation, given the other’s strategy. Such an
equilibrium is a characteristic of the game (M 1 , M2 ) but no
such equilibrium in pure policies may exist for some games.
However, there always exists at least one such equilibrium
in mixed policies for an arbitrary ﬁnite bimatrix game [14].
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3. Policy Gradient Learners
Recent convergence results in single-agent policy gradient learning [17, 18] encouraged the rise of variants of Policy Hill Climbers (PHC) like WoLF (Win or Learn Fast)
[2, 3] which has been shown to learn stationary best responses to the opponents in some small games. The simple PHC algorithm updates a value function (Q values) according to the usual Q-learning rule 1 and then increases the
probability of the maximising action by a ﬁxed δ ∈ (0, 1],
while decreasing the probabilities of the other actions uniformly to keep π a legal probability distribution. It does
not converge to Nash equilibrium policies in self play in
all games, but WoLF-PHC which uses a variable rate δ according to the scheme




if a π(s, a)Q(s, a) > a π̄(s, a)Q(s, a)
δw
δl > δw otherwise
(1)
where π̄(s, a) is an average policy calculated over time,
has been empirically shown to converge
in many inter
esting
games.
The
situation
where
π(s,
a)Q(s, a) >
a

π̄(s,
a)Q(s,
a),
i.e.,
where
the
expected
payoff
of the
a
learner is greater than that of an average policy against the
opponent’s current policy, is called winning. We shall refer to the ratio δδwl as λ. All these variants of PHC believe
that the opponent is playing a stationary policy and hence
try to learn a stationary best response to that policy. Chang
and Kaelbling [5] classiﬁed these as H ∞ × B0 learners as
they have full access to their history (H) but believe (B) that
the opponent plays a stationary strategy i.e., that the opponent does not use any memory. They demonstrated that
such deﬁciency in beliefs could be exploited to their disadvantage while eluding convergence. The Exploiter (adapted
from [5] in Table 1 for clarity) essentially belongs to the
league H∞ ×B∞ since it believes that the opponent is playing a non-stationary strategy and learns when losing (at the
same rate that it estimates the opponent to be learning, this
estimate being δ̂2 ) but exploits when winning, by playing
the maximising action deterministically (step e). The Exploiter also uses a slightly different method to compute the
WoLF condition than equation 1. It explicitly estimates the
opponent’s policy (step c) and uses either estimation or apriori knowledge (we have endowed the Exploiter with this latter option) for its equilibrium policy, and accordingly computes the right hand side of equation 1. Moreover, in all experimental comparisons among algorithms, all common parameters, viz. α, δ will be assumed identical unless otherwise noted.

δ=

1

The rule is usually given by Qt+1 (a) = (1 − α)Qt (a) + αrt where
α is the learning rate, rt is the payoff at time t and a is the action
whose value is updated.

1.5
1

1.5

π 2 (H)

0.5

Cl
0

Cl

t

#(h[τ ]=b)

τ =t−W
, ∀b ∈ A2 ,
policy, π̂2t (b) =
W
where W is size of estimation window, #(h[τ ] =
b) = 1 if aτ2 = b, else #(h[τ ] = b) = 0.
(d) Calculate estimate of opponent’s learning rate,

|π̂ t −π̂ t−W |

.
δ̂2 ← 2 W2

(e) If a π1 (a)Q(a) > V1 (π1∗ , π̂2t )

1 if a = arg max a Q(a )
π1 (a) ←
0 otherwise
else

δ̂2 if a = arg max a Q(a )
π1 (a) ← π1 (a)+
−δ̂2
otherwise
|A1 |−1
Table 1. The PHC-Exploiter Algorithm

4. Exploitation in Matching Pennies
A frequent strategic situation is one where one player
tries to match the other’s action while the other wants to select an action distinct from the opponent’s. E.g. a goalie
wants to dive in the same direction as the shot whereas
the shooter’s intention is exactly the opposite. When a magician asks the spectators to guess which of his hands
holds the coin, he intends them to choose the wrong hand
while the spectators want to embarrass him. Such situations are represented by the simple bimatrix zero-sum
game M1 (H, H) = M1 (T, T ) = −1, M1 (H, T ) =
M1 (T, H) = 1, M2 (., .) = −M1 (., .) called matching pennies. Here A1 = A2 = {H, T }, and the goal of agent
1 is to mismatch action with agent 2, while the latter desires a match. This game has no pure equilibrium and the
only equilibrium is mixed, with each player’s actions being equally likely. This game is suited for studying cumulative gains since in each iteration the payoffs can either increase or decrease by 1. The Exploiter designed by Chang
and Kaelbling [5] was shown to beat WoLF in cumulative
gain in this game. We shall concentrate on this game in this
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−0.5

−0.5

(c) Observe action a t2 of opponent (time t), update
history h and calculate
 an estimate of opponent’s

Cw
0.5

1

Cw

0

2. Repeat
(a) Select action a according to π 1 with suitable exploration.
(b) Observe reward r and update Q(a) ← (1 −
α)Q(a) + αr.

π 2 (H)

1. Assume Expoliter is agent 1 and opponent is agent
2 and a single state problem (repeated game). Input
α, δ ∈ (0, 1], the learning rates. Initialize Q(a) ← 0,
π1 (a) ← |A11 | .

paper though our results are applicable in other zero-sum bimatrix games where reactivity (deﬁned in section 6) is a key
factor affecting performance.
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Figure 1. The Exploiter’s joint policy trajectory against WoLF-PHC. Left: Trajectory
same as against PHC when δ̂2 is accurate.
Right: Typical trajectory when δ̂2 is inaccurate.

The Exploiter’s joint trajectory in the policy space with
a PHC player is (shown in Figure 1 left) as follows [5]: the
Exploiter (player 1 in game (M 1 , M2 )) selects heads with
probability 0 (π 1 (H) = 0) as long as the opponent’s probability of selecting heads is π 2 (H) ≥ 0.5, while the PHC reduces π2 (H) from 1 to 0.5. In this phase the exploiter is
winning and hence exploiting the fact that in majority cases
he is likely to “mismatch” the opponent by playing T deterministically. As in [5], this part of the cycle is called C w .
After this the exploiter starts losing and increases π 1 (H)
linearly (at the same estimated rate as the opponent is decreasing π2 (H) from 0.5 to 0, i.e., δ̂2 ) till the PHC’s π2 (H)
is down to 0. This loss phase of the cycle is referred to as
Cl .Then the Exploiter instantly shifts π 1 (H) to 1 and continues in a symmetric fashion. The analysis for the behavior of the Exploiter against PHC was presented in [5]. In
this paper we present the analysis of the Exploiter’s behavior against a WoLF-PHC player and show that though the
latter belongs to the class H ∞ × B0 , it can still beat the Exploiter in cumulative payoffs under certain conditions.

4.1. Exploiter versus WoLF-PHC
We note that when δ̂2 is accurate at all times, the joint trajectory against a WoLF-PHC will be identical to that against
a PHC player, as shown in Figure 1 left. If the estimate δ̂2
is inaccurate (described below) then the joint trajectory will
be something like Figure 1 right. However, the key difference between PHC and WoLF-PHC as opponents, is that
the opponent WoLF will be able to get out of its loss phase
(win phase for Exploiter, C w ) at a faster rate (δl ) than PHC

Lemma 1 Assume that the Exploiter knows the opponent
WoLF-PHC’s policy at all times, but calculates a time varying (inaccurate) estimate of the opponent’s learning rate,
i.e., δ̂2 (t) such that
 τ
1
θ= 2
δ̂2 (t)(τ 2 − t2 )dt
τ 0
assuming the above integral exists. τ is the length
of a loss phase for the Exploiter. Then the WoLFPHC
can beat the Exploiter in cumulative payoffs, i.e.,

t
t
Cl +Cw V1 (π1 , π2 )dt < 0, if the former uses
λ < 1 − 2θ.
Proof: If the Exploiter knows the opponent’s policy at all
times t, then its computation of the winning criterion becomes more accurate. In case of Matching Pennies the equilibrium payoff of the Exploiter is 0 against any opponent
policy, so the Exploiter compares its current expected payoff to 0 to identify winning situations. Writing π 1t (H) and
π2t (H) simply as π1 and π2 respectively, we get the Exploiter’s expected payoff at time t is given by
V1 (π1 , π2 )

= −π1 π2 − (1 − π1 )(1 − π2 ) + π1 (1 − π2 )
+(1 − π1 )π2
= −4π1 π2 + 2π1 + 2π2 − 1

During Cl , the opponent WoLF tries to move π 2 from 0.5 to
0 linearly at the rate of δ w (WoLF is winning in this phase)
and the Exploiter changes π 1 from 0 to 0.5 at the variable
rate δ̂2 (t). However, given the way the Exploiter computes
δ̂2 (t), it is easy to see that δ̂2 (t) ≥ δw at all times in Cl . Thus
the Exploiter will reach 0.5 before WoLF reaches 0, and let
this time (when Cl ends) be τ . This is visualized in Figure 1
right. Now the instantaneouspolicies can be expressed as
t
functions of time t as π 1 = 0 δ̂2 (t)dt and π2 = 12 − δw t
where Cl lasts from t = 0 to t = τ . Consequently the expected payoff of the Exploiter in C l is

V1 (π1 , π2 )dt = (2θ − 1)δw τ 2
V1L =
Cl

where θ is as given in the statement of the Lemma. During Cw , unlike against PHC, the joint trajectory starts at
(0, 0.5 + δw τ ) instead of (0, 1). In this case, π 1 = 0
and π2 = 0.5 + δw τ − δl t and Cw lasts from t = 0 to
τ
t = δw
δl = λτ , and the expected payoff of the Exploiter in
Cw is

δ2 τ 2
W
V1 (π1 , π2 )dt = w
V1 =
δl
Cw
Thus the total reward over a complete cycle, V 1 = 2 ×
(V1W + V1L ) can be negative when (V 1W + V1L ) < 0, i.e.,
when λ < 1 − 2θ.
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Corollary 1 If the Exploiter can estimate the opponent’s
learning rate accurately at all times, then it will be beaten
in cumulative payoff by a WoLF-PHC player if the latter
uses λ < 13 .
Proof: As stated earlier, in this case the joint trajectory will
be similar to that against a PHC player (Figure 1 left) since
during Cl , both Exploiter and WoLF use the ﬁxed learning rate of δw . That means in Cl , δ̂2 (t) = δw at all times
t and the length of C l becomes τ = 2δ1w . Using the computed values we get θ = 23 δw τ and the result follows from
Lemma 1.
Exploiter’s total reward against various opponents

can. We show below that if δ l is fast enough, WoLF can actually beat Exploiter in cumulative payoffs.

14000
12000

WoLF-PHC with λ = 1/4
WoLF-PHC with λ = 1/2
PHC with δ = δl of WoLF

10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
-2000

0

20000

40000 60000
Time

80000

100000

Figure 2. Exploiter’s cumulative gains against
a WoLF-PHC using δl = 8 × 10−5, δw = 2 × 10−5
(hence λ = 14 ), against another WoLF-PHC using δl = 8 × 10−5 , δw = 4 × 10−5 (hence λ = 12 ),
and against a PHC player using δ = 8 × 10 −5
(=δl of WoLF-PHC).

The above results are summarized in the experimental
payoff curves of the Exploiter in Figure 2.
Lemma 2 If the Exploiter knows accurately the opponent
WoLF-PHC’s policy and learning rate at all time, and the
WoLF-PHC agent uses δw = 0 (i.e., λ = 0, we call such an
agent WoLF-0), then instead of any repeating cycle, their
policy trajectories always come to a halt at
1. the initial joint policy point (π 10 , π20 ), if 0.5 ≤ π10 ≤ 1
and 0.5 ≤ π20 ≤ 1 or if 0 ≤ π10 ≤ 0.5 and 0 ≤ π 20 ≤
0.5.
2. (0, 0.5) if 0 ≤ π 10 < 0.5 and 0.5 < π 20 ≤ 1.
3. (1, 0.5) if 0.5 < π 10 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ π 20 < 0.5.
Proof: The proof is straightforward noting that (i) C w cannot last indeﬁnitely and (ii) in any C l phase, since the WoLF
is winning, π2 will stop changing and the Exploiter trying
to move at the same pace as the opponent at that time, will
also effectively stop changing π 1 .

0
-100
-200
-300
-400
-500

alpha=0
alpha=0.001
alpha=0.1
alpha=0.7
alpha=1.0

-600
-700

0

4.2. Exploiter versus Q-learner
We consider a speciﬁc version of a Q-learner for a stage
game, named Q, and deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 3 Q uses the usual value function update rule
Qt+1 (a) = (1 − α)Qt (a) + αrt where α is its learning
rate and rt is the payoff at time t, selects action a t according to rule at = arg maxb Qt (b) while randomizing uniformly among actions with equal (and maximum) Q-value,
and apart from this uses no other exploration scheme.
Clearly Q can adapt to the opponent’s policy quickly depending on how large α is. If α = 1 it will exhibit a kneejerk reaction to the opponent’s last action and will generally
not let the opponent to hold it back in the vicinity of a particular strategy in its policy space, that the Exploiter can exploit. This is precisely what the Exploiter does to a PHC
(or variant) and succeeds whenever the PHC (or variant) is
slow to react. Hence, by construction we expect the Q to
be generally unexploitable by the Exploiter (i.e., V 1  >0).
Figure 3 (left) presents the experimental expected payoff
curves of the Exploiter against Q, and suggests that Q is
actually capable of beating the Exploiter. Note, though, that
in some cases the Exploiter may be able to exploit the Q,
e.g., when the Exploiter knows that Q’s α = 1 i.e. it always plays best response to the Exploiter’s last action, the
Exploiter can play the actions H, T alternately always ensuring +1 reward at every step. This will be discussed again
in light of our reactivity measure.

5. The Classiﬁcation Scheme
We have identiﬁed PHC variants and Q belonging to the
group H∞ × B0 (a class that [5] refers to as fair opponents
for the Exploiter) that can defeat the Exploiter in cumulative
expected payoffs under certain conditions. This is contrary
to the purpose of the H × B classiﬁcation scheme, since the
scheme predicts that the Exploiter should score at least the
minimax payoff in Matching Pennies against any fair opponent. Moreover, Q belongs to H ∞ × B0 when α < 1
2

The nomenclature is borrowed from Behavioral Psychology
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Cumulative return of Exploiter against Q

Corollary 2 If the Exploiter knows accurately the opponent WoLF-0’s policy and learning rate at all time, then the
former’s expected payoff at any time after the policy trajectories have come to rest is ≤ 0.

1000

100

Exploiter’s total reward against Q

It is worthwhile to note that this version of WoLF
has been studied before under the title of Win Stay, Lose
Shift2 [15]. Interestingly, the Exploiter is never able to beat
WoLF-0 in expected payoffs in the steady state, as seen
from the next corollary.
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Figure 3. Exploiter’s cumulative gain against
Q for various values of Q’s α (left) and Exploiter’s W (right). Left: Exploiter’s α is ﬁxed
at 0.9, and its W = 3000. Right: Exploiter’s
α = 0.9 and Q’s α = 0.8.
and H1 × B0 when α = 1. The classiﬁcation scheme requires that H1 × B0 be a weaker class than H ∞ × B0 but the
former version of Q attains a higher payoff (less exploitation) than the latter version against the Exploiter in Figure 3
(left). These are behaviors that the H × B scheme clearly
fails to explain.
Our take at this apparent contradiction is that the H × B
scheme is incomplete, even though it is undoubtedly important in delineating learner capabilities. What it essentially
states is that if an agent uses more resources (i.e., belongs
to a higher league of H × B) then it should be more capable than the ones using less resources. However, the possibility of an agent using less resource but in a more effective manner being still able to beat a higher league opponent has been overlooked. We reconcile this latter observation with the essence of the H × B classiﬁcation scheme by
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 The Hs × Bt scheme, rather than representing the capability of all agents in a group [5], actually represents the maximal capability of any agent in that group.
An agent with the maximal capability of its group cannot
be beaten by the corresponding (or any) agent in a lower
group. However, it cannot be guaranteed that the former
will beat the latter.
This allows for agents in higher groups to be beaten by those
of lower groups simply because the former makes suboptimal use of its available resources. An important example of
an agent attaining maximal capability in its class is a universally consistent learner [8, 7]. Such a learner is safe, i.e.,
attains its minimax payoff at the very least, irrespective of
the opponent, e.g., smooth ﬁctitious play [8] but not ﬁctitious play. Multiplicative weight [7] which has this property, belongs to the league of H ∞ × B∞ as observed in [5].
But Exp3 [1] which also has this property belongs to the

class H∞ × B0 , and it cannot be beaten by any opponent in
a lower or even a higher group. Therefore, Exp3 is an algorithm with the maximal capability in group H ∞ × B0 . The
above hypothesis is consistent with these observations.
Having noted the limitation of the H × B classiﬁcation
scheme, we now move to identify the key factor affecting the performances of various algorithms in the Matching Pennies game. To develop the intuition for such a measure, we note that a recurring theme in section 4 was that a
learner capable of getting out of its loss phase faster usually
performed well. It is also worthwhile to note that the Exploiter behaves like Q when winning but like a PHC when
losing. Hence at least when losing, the Exploiter is slow
to update its policy and adapt to the opponent. This indicates that the capability of Q to react faster to the opponent’s policies all the time, may be the reason for its superior performance against the Exploiter. In the following section we formalize this idea of reactivity and show that it can
indeed explain the curves in Figures 2,3. We do not tout reactivity as a sufﬁcient criterion for rating learner capabilities. We only claim that it is a necessary criterion in case of
some speciﬁc games like Matching Pennies, Rock-ScissorsPaper etc., and in conjunction with the H×B scheme, might
be sufﬁcient. However, we do not verify this latter part of
the claim in this paper.

6. Reactivity
The key intuition behind the Exploiter’s success against
PHC variants is that when winning, the Exploiter adapts
immediately to the opponent’s policy, but adapts more cautiously (no slower than its estimate of the opponent’s rate)
when losing. We call this speed of adaptibility, reactivity
and denote it by R it for agent i at time t. We propose a
generic deﬁnition of reactivity as below.
Deﬁnition 4 The reactivity of agent i at time t is given by
Rit = f (T ) where T = min max τ, s.t. πit+τ ∈ BRi (π−i )
τ >0 π−i

where π−i is a hypothetical policy that the opponent might
turn to at exactly time t and continue to play it thereafter.
The exact functional form f (an appropriate inverse function) needs to be deﬁned in context of the speciﬁc player
and the game being played.
In other words, imaginably, if the opponent switches its policy (to π−i ) at time t and maintains it for sufﬁciently long,
then a function of the shortest time after which the player i
can play a best response to the worst case switch of the opponent is its reactivity at that time. Obviously this would
also depend on the initial conﬁguration at time t and the
target conﬁguration arising due to the opponent’s switch
(imaginary), which will be nulliﬁed through the choice of
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f . Now some of the algorithms under study exhibit different reactivities at win times (t ∈ W ) than at loss times
(t ∈ L), so we generally distinguish between reactivities at
loss times RiL = maxt∈L {Rit } and that at win times, R iW
deﬁned similarly.

Analysis in the Matching Pennies Game
In the following analysis we assume the algorithms normally using Q-update rule actually use the following informed Q-update rule. This makes the analysis easier.
Deﬁnition 5 An informed Q-update rule for agent i is one
that allows update of all action values by their expected
payoffs at every iteration t,
t
(a) = Qti (a) + α[Vi (a, π−i
) − Qti (a)], ∀a ∈ Ai
Qt+1
i

We write π̃i as the target policy for the learner after the opponent switches its policy to stationary π −i as stated in Definition 4, and let Q̃i be the resulting target Q-value function for the learner. Let ∆ tQ = Qti − Q̃i  where . is a
max norm over the action space. Then the following lemma
establishes the value of T (Deﬁnition 4) for PHC in the
Matching Pennies game.
Lemma 3 For a PHC player (player i) using an informed
Q-update rule and δ ≥ δ 0 ,
 t 
∆
log Q̃Q
1
 i  +
T =
(2)
1
δ
log
1−α

at any time t, where δ0 = πit  log



1
1−α



/ log



∆tQ
Q̃i 


.

Proof: Without loss of generality assume that the target
policy before time t (i.e., before the opponent’s switch as in
Deﬁnition 4) is [1, 0]. That means Q ti = [a, −a] for some
a > 0. Then, given that δ is high enough (i.e. ≥ δ 0 ), the
worst case switch by the opponent will make π̃ i = [0, 1],
i.e., Q̃i = [−b, b] for some b > 0. The result is established
noting that action values have to switch signs before the policy can approach π̃ i .
If δ < δ0 , there are some distinct cases leading to different values of T but it can be shown that identical functional
forms of T applies to WoLF and Exploiter in all of those
cases, though for Exploiter when winning and for Q, the
second term in the sum (equation 2) is 1 (also in all cases).
Speciﬁcally, for the algorithms under study and all admissible values of δ (i.e., 1 ≥ δ ≥ 0), we have a generic form
of T given by T = d 1 g(α) + d2 h(δ) where d1 , d2 are de1
pendent on the initial situation, and g(α) = 1/ log( 1−α
),
1
h(δ) = δ . For Q and winning Exploiter, h = d 2 = 1.
For the purpose of comparison of the algorithms, we eliminate the initial conditions in the form of d 1 , d2 , and choose

1
the inverse form of f (Deﬁnition 4) as f = g.h
when
0 ≤ α < 1 and 1 ≥ δ ≥ 0. The following analysis also
holds for the same ranges of α, δ.


1
δ, ∀t,
=
log 1−α
Thus we have, R Pt HC




1
1
L
W
RW oLF = log 1−α δl > log 1−α δw = RW oLF , and




1
1
L
W
RExploiter
= log 1−α
.
δ̂2 ≤ log 1−α
= RExploiter
We also deﬁne the overall reactivity of agent i as
Ri = max{RiW , RiL }. However, there is another crucial question that has not been addressed, in addition
to reactivity: when does the agent display higher reactivity? In general, when an agent is losing it should
adapt faster but should adapt slowly when winning in order to prolong the winning phase to maximise cumulative
return3 . Thus this question is critical in predicting the performance of the learning algorithms under study against an
opponent like the Exploiter in games like Matching Pennies. Hence we deﬁne a new criterion for rating different PHC variants called effective reactivity and denoted by
Ri , which tempers the overall reactivity R i value by a fraction that speciﬁes how high the loss time reactivity (R iL )
W
is relative to the sum of loss
 and win time (R i ) reactivi-

ties, i.e., Ri =

RL
i
RL
+RW
i
i

Ri .



1
δ,
According to this deﬁnition, R P HC = 12 log 1−α


1
and RW oLF = 1+1δw log 1−α
δl . Since δl > δw ,
 δl 
1
δl , which means WoLF has a
RW oLF > 12 log 1−α
higher effective reactivity than PHC even when the latter
uses δ = δl . Therefore the Exploiter scores higher against
such a PHC than
as
 WoLF

 seen in ﬁgure 2. Also,
 against
1
δ̂2 . In practice usually
RExploiter = 1+1δ̂ log 1−α
2

δ̂2  δδwl which means usually Exploiter has a higher effective reactivity than WoLF, but if λ = δδwl is small enough,
the performances may be reversed. Note that this predicts
the result of Corollary 1 only approximately. However, accurate prediction would necessitate a more intricate measure but we ﬁnd the simplicity of R more appealing.
Now in case of WoLF-0,
the effective reactivity is

1
RW oLF −0 = log 1−α δl > RExploiter , when the α val-

ues are equal even if the Exploiter’s estimate δ̂2 is sufﬁciently close to δl used by WoLF-0, since δ l ≥ δ̂2 ≥ 0.
Hence the Exploiter can never be expected to beat WoLF-0
(in steady state), which is in accordance with Corollary 2.
Finally
we
 note that the effective reactivity of Q is

1
1
log
2
1−α . So in order to achieve R Exploiter > RQ , we
need δ̂2 > 1 if α values are equal. But is this possible? The
3

Incidentally, this is close to the philosophy of WoLF
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Exploiter estimates the opponent’s policy (see Table 1) by
noting the relative frequencies of his different actions over a
window of size W , and calculating the distance between the
two distributions resulting from two successive windows,
normalized by the window size. If we assume this distance
measure to
be Euclidean, then the maximum value possible
√
√
2, RExploiter < RQ ,
for δ̂2 is W2 . Since usually W
when α values of the two agents are equal. In addition,
RQ

1
can only increase with higher α since log 1−α is an increasing function of α in the range α ∈ [0, 1]. These observations ﬁt accurately with the experimental results in Figure 3 (left). Moreover, if any of the algorithms use α = 0,
its effective reactivity becomes 0 which is expected since
such an algorithm effectively loses any capacity of learning or adapting to an opponent. But note from Deﬁnition 3
that if Q uses α = 0, it will always play the equilibrium
policy in Matching Pennies, if its initial Q-values of all actions were identical. This was the case in our experiments,
and the corresponding curve in Figure 3 (left) veriﬁes that it
does indeed roughly score the minimax payoff.
It is interesting to note that the more accurately the Exploiter tries to estimate δ̂2 (larger window), less is its effective reactivity, and the poorer it should perform against Q.
However, if it uses a very short window (say size 1, equivalent to saying that the Exploiter believes Q’s α = 1, the
case mentioned in Section 4.2) then it is likely to have a δ̂2
as high as 1 sometimes, and with a slightly higher α than
Q, it may have a high enough reactivity to beat Q. For instance,
Exploiter uses α = 0.9 and Q uses α = 0.8, then
 if 
1
of the former will be 1.43 times higher than that
log 1−α
of the latter. In this case the Exploiter is quite likely (but not
guaranteed) to have a higher effective reactivity than Q. Figure 3 (right) veriﬁes these claims, and reinforces the necessity of R in rating learner capabilities in games like Matching Pennies, at least for the types considered in this paper.

7. Can Exploitation be Prevented Consciously?
We have seen thus far, how the Exploiter consciously
tries to exploit its victims, and how the latter can sometimes
reverse such exploitation. We now ask a related question if an algorithm tries to avoid exploitation consciously can it
guarantee to prevent the same irrespective of the opponent?
We focus on a speciﬁc sense of the term exploitation and deﬁne it to mean an opponent playing a “bluff” policy to lead
the learner into a region of its policy space where the opponent can achieve signiﬁcant rewards (enough to more than
make up for its losses during the bluff) by the means of a
“bash” policy, as long as the learner remains in the vicinity of this unfavorable position, and be able to repeat this
“bluff and bash” cycle indeﬁnitely. Since this is not neces-

sarily bad for the learner in general-sum games, we focus
on zero-sum games only.
Deﬁnition 6 A TAEC (trying to avoid exploitation consciously) agent in class H s × Bt is one that uses Hs (and
rewards in the s-window) to explicitly identify any exploitation and uses this knowledge in conjunction with B t to prevent exploitation.
We argue (informally) that a TAEC agent in H s ×Bt for any
ﬁnite s, t that tries to consciously avoid exploitation 4 may
not be able to do so.
Lemma 4 Any TAEC agent cannot be absolutely exploitation free in the sense deﬁned above.
Proof: (Sketch) If an agent assumes that its opponent is using t < ∞ units of its history to formulate its policies, then
it is possible, in principle, that there is an opponent actually using more than t units of history and being able to exploit the agent because of the deﬁciency in its belief. Again,
if s < ∞, then it is possible, in principle, that the opponent spreads its “bluff and bash” cycle over a window signiﬁcantly larger than s units of time, so that an s-window
estimate simply fails to identify any exploitation. Hence it
is necessary (but may not be sufﬁcient) that both s, t be inﬁnite for the agent to entertain any hope of being guaranteed exploitation-free. However, we know from [13] that an
agent in H∞ × B∞ is impossible to design, since though
the set of possible strategies is uncountably inﬁnite, there
are only countably inﬁnite histories and beliefs.
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8. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we addressed the apparent deﬁciency of
H × B based classiﬁcation of MALs by showing that fair
opponents can beat a higher league Exploiter in a zero-sum
game. Then we presented a new general criterion called reactivity that measures how fast an agent can learn a best
response to an unexpected worst case switch in the opponent’s policy, and showed that it approximately predicts the
performance of a learner as a function of the parameters of
its learning algorithm, in the Matching Pennies game. Emphasis was placed on the ease of computing this measure,
hence it is sufﬁciently general but still capable of approximately explaining the behaviors of PHC-variants, Q and
the Exploiter in the Matching Pennies game, as seen in experiments. In future we would like to investigate how exactly the new criterion ﬁts into the H × B picture. We also
want to generalize our notion of reactivity and extend our
experimental results to other zero-sum games and complex
stochastic games.
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